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EUSA Review Forum
European Echoes in 
Asian Regionalism
in europe, the EU seems to face an unprecedented 
set of challenges. Outside of Europe, however, the 
notion that the EU may serve as a model for projects 
elsewhere remains extremely widespread. In recent 
years, no region has seen more discussion of such 
“European echoes,” among both policy-makers and 
scholars, than Asia. On the one hand, this attention 
seems surprising: Asia may well be the region where 
national-level heterogeneity in size, wealth, and do-
mestic institutions make European imitations seem 
least likely. On the other hand, it is probably this 
heterogeneity—and the tensions it often carries—
that encourages many Asian thinkers to look to the 
European model of cooperation and integration.
The contributors to this Forum include a Chi-
nese political scientist, trained in Europe, who now 
works at a Japanese university (Min Shu); an econo-
mist who has lived, studied, taught, and worked on 
public policy in both Asia and the United States for 
many years (Ramkishen Rajan); a European who 
has studied and taught in the United States and has 
recently become interested in Asia (Katja Weber); 
and, lastly, your American-American Editor (Craig 
Parsons). Shu, Weber, and I all discuss the likeli-
hood (or at least possibility) of European “echoes” in 
Asian regionalism, but from very different approach-
es. Rajan offers a much more concrete, near-term 
evaluation of the appeal of an Asian Currency Unit.
Craig Parsons, EUSA Review Editor 
EUSA at Twenty: A Successful Conference at 
Marina del Rey
the conference of EUSA “at twenty” at Marina del 
Rey under the chair of Liesbet Hooghe was widely 
acknowledged to have been a very successful event 
with a rich and diverse program of panels, plenaries 
and workshops that elicited positive responses and 
lively debates. The broad range of proposals sub-
mitted to the program chair, Frank Schimmelfennig, 
under the six thematic streams of integration theory, 
institutions, economics and political economy, political 
sociology, law and public policy and external relations 
met with a lot of interest with paper givers and partici-
pants in general. Parallel running panels with equally 
attractive topics and debates frequently rendered the 
choice of attending one instead of another quite dif-
ficult. The “decentralized” form of program planning, 
introduced for the first time at this EUSA conference, 
therefore may be considered to reflect very well the 
multiple demands and interests of conference par-
ticipants and their interest in studying the European 
Union from many different angles. The conference 
for the first time also offered the possibility of an ex-
change of information on teaching on the European 
Union at U.S. schools. It caused favorable reactions 
from teachers participating in the conference. A par-
ticularly memorable part of the conference was the 
prize awarding ceremony for Philippe Schmitter, with 
the different acknowledgments of his scholarly con-
tributions to the research on the European Union.
As newly elected chair of EUSA together with 
the other new members of the executive commit-
tee I would like to thank Liesbet Hooghe and the 
other outgoing members of the executive commit-
tee for their excellent work in preparing and realiz-
ing the conference, thanks that are also conveyed 
to Joe Figliulo, the executive director of EUSA. 
The conference was the highlight of the two years’ 
work of the former chair and executive committee, 
but by no means its only achievement. One eminent-
ly important task has been the success in balancing 
the EUSA budget. It is on the basis of the success-
ful work of the former executive committee chaired 
by Liesbet that its successor can hope to continue 
the successful work and engage in new activities. 
Adrienne Héritier
Florence May 2009
From the Chair
EUSA Review    Spring 2009   3 
National Identity and Regional Integration: A 
Comparison between Europe and East Asia
Min Shu
regional cooperation and integration differ a lot be-
tween Europe and East Asia. In Europe, regional in-
tegration has followed an institutionalised path, fea-
turing, inter alia, a supranational legal framework, a 
sophisticated structure of European institutions, a 
dedicated group of transnational bureaucrats, and 
successful functional cooperation across multiple 
policy areas. In East Asia, despite the recent Decla-
ration on the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community, 
regional cooperation and integration have not yet 
produced substantial outcomes beyond a regional 
web of Free Trade Agreements. Instead, East Asian 
regionalism is characterised by multiple sub-regional 
cooperative schemes (ASEAN, APEC, SCO, the Six-
Party Talk, etc.), the lack of a solid institutional and 
legal foundation, and the principle of non-interference. 
However, when it comes to the roles of national 
identity, Europe and East Asia share some interesting 
similarities. Firstly, opinion polls conducted in the two 
regions show that strong national identity generally 
weakens individual support for regional integration. 
The more a person identifies herself as an aggressive 
nationalist, the less likely she is to embrace regional 
cooperative schemes. Secondly, regional integration 
is contingent on the political mobilisation of national 
identity in both Europe and East Asia. Nationalist sen-
timents were not only an important factor behind the 
defeated Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties, but also 
cast a shadow on some promising regional coopera-
tive schemes in East Asia—the Sino-Japanese joint 
gas exploration in the East China Sea is a notable 
example. Thirdly, the political discourse of national 
identity varies from country to country. Yet, across 
Europe and East Asia, nationalist discourse often 
involves both a domestic and a regional dimension. 
How does national identity interact with region-
al cooperation and integration in Europe and East 
Asia? To answer this question, the essay explores 
the impact of national identity on regional integra-
tion from a cross-regional perspective. Due to lim-
ited space, the analysis focuses on the mobilisa-
tion and discursive dimensions of national identity. 
Political Mobilization of National Identity
After the ratification turmoil of the Maastricht Trea-
ty, public attitudes to European integration started to 
take a different shape. With economic considerations 
on the decline (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007), national 
identity turned into a salient issue. Adding to its politi-
cal mobilization has been the willingness of peripheral 
(and some mainstream) parties to cash in on public 
disillusion with European integration. Not only did 
identity politics find its way into small party groups in 
the European Parliament, it also substantially strength-
ened the No campaigns of the defeated referendums 
on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and on the Lis-
bon Treaty in 2008. Whether the growing salience of 
identity politics will determine the long-term trajecto-
ry of regional integration remains an open question. 
Nonetheless, national identity is bound to play a key 
role in the foreseeable future of European integration. 
On the other side of the Eurasian continent, national 
identity has been an even more important issue in re-
gional cooperation and integration. At about the same 
time that Europeans were debating the Constitutional 
Treaty around the French and Dutch referendums, anti-
Japanese demonstrations took place across mainland 
China, Taiwan, North and South Korea and the Philip-
pines. Their main target was a middle-school textbook 
which downplays the atrocities committed by the Japa-
nese army during the Second World War. Events such 
as this seriously disrupted regional cooperation in East 
Asia. Unfortunately, mobilized national identity was also 
the main reason behind the Korean naval dispatch to 
the Dokdo/Takeshima islets in 2006, Vietnam’s mass 
protests against China in 2007, and the military con-
frontation between Cambodia and Thailand in 2008. 
Although the prospect of regional cooperation and 
integration has been overshadowed by nationalist 
sentiments in both Europe and East Asia, there is a 
crucial difference between the two regions. In Europe, 
most mainstream political parties are still reluctant to 
profit politically on nationalist feelings. It is the radi-
cal right-wing and extreme left-wing parties that are 
standing at the forefront of mobilising national iden-
tity with regard to regional integration. In the long 
run, the balance of their rhetorical power may decide 
whether European integration remains a de-politi-
cised project of functional cooperation or becomes 
a wakened “giant” oriented towards politicized con-
frontation along “GAL-TAN” lines (green/alternative/
libertarian versus traditional/authoritarian/nationalist). 
In East Asia, by contrast, national identity is a 
central issue for political parties in the mainstream. 
Defending national identity is usually something both 
governing groups and oppositions find difficult to 
disagree with. From time to time, mobilized national 
identity is exploited by political forces which seek to 
enhance their own legitimacy. During the Korean-
Japanese dispute on the Dokdo/Takeshima islets in 
2006, for example, the main opposition party in South 
Korea—the Grand National Party (GNP)—refrained 
from usual criticism and offered complete support 
for a hard-line position. Its leader was quoted as 
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saying, “There should be no compromise on the is-
sue of territorial sovereignty. If the government han-
dles the situation sternly and according to this prin-
ciple, the GNP will fully cooperate” (cf. Midford 2008). 
The political opportunity structure of national identity 
is closely related to its mobilization patterns. As Euro-
pean integration faces the challenges of identity politics 
due to mainstream ambivalence and inaction, regional 
cooperation in East Asia is struggling with explosive na-
tionalist sentiments backed by the political mainstream. 
Discursive Structure of National Identity
A close examination of the discursive structure of 
national identity reveals more about the comparative dy-
namics of regional integration in Europe and East Asia. 
In Europe, the discourse of national identity takes 
three distinctive forms in relation to regional integra-
tion. In some cases, mobilized nationalist sentiments 
find resonance among those who are afraid of eco-
nomic losses resulting from the inflow of immigrants 
and foreign products. Anti-immigration views and eco-
nomic nationalism are the basic discursive formula 
of such political mobilization. In other cases, national 
identity is framed in terms of protecting cultural, reli-
gious or political tradition against the penetration of re-
gional governance. One needs not to look further than 
the anti-abortion movement in Ireland or the British at-
tachment to the Westminster to recognise such discur-
sive impacts. In still others, national identity is related 
to the domestic models of social and economic institu-
tions, with “social Europe” as a typical example during 
the French referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. 
In all these discursive forms, national iden-
tity tends to be a self-reference tool of protecting 
well-defined domestic norms, values and lives from 
the external influences of European integration. 
Its discursive structure features a superior domes-
tic dimension and an inferior regional dimension. 
In East Asia, nationalist sentiments rarely re-
semble the European model. National identity finds 
more discursive power by referring to disputed terri-
torial issues, the humiliation of colonisation and for-
eign invasion, or the historical animosity between 
neighbouring countries. Among the disputed territo-
ries, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island, the Dokdo/Take-
shima islets, the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and 
the Preah Vihear Temple are all sensitive topics ca-
pable of mobilizing aggressive nationalist identity. 
Furthermore, the historical animosity between neigh-
bouring countries, together with the memories for a 
humiliated past, serves a vivid reference point for 
nationalist behaviour in most East Asian countries. 
Considering the heightened nationalist sentiments, 
it is notable that anti-immigration mobilization is hard-
ly an issue in East Asia. While politically salient, the 
nationalist discourse does not rely on privileged do-
mestic values or dangerous external influences. More 
often than not, the unacceptable territorial claims by 
neighbouring countries or the improper recognition by 
former invaders gives the central meanings to mobi-
lized national identity in East Asia. Here, what really 
matters is the behaviour of the regional other. With-
in such a discursive structure, the regional dimen-
sion appears more important than the domestic one. 
Post-Functionalist vs. Pre-Functionalist?
In a recent article, Hooghe and Marks (2008) ar-
gue that as the EU turns away from a functional and 
bargaining logic, neofunctionalism and intergovern-
mentalism are giving way to what they call “a postfunc-
tionalist theory of European integration.” In their view, 
exclusive territorial identity and its politicization have 
led European integration into a postfunctional arena 
where functional cooperation is of less importance. 
At a glance, territorial identity also plays an im-
portant role in the regional cooperation of East Asia. 
However, most East Asian countries, unlike their Euro-
pean counterparts, are still involved in the process of 
building a mature and modern state. Their economic 
development models are being defined; modern po-
litical infrastructure is being created; domestic culture 
and traditions are being re-assessed. Under such cir-
cumstances, it is quite difficult for a consensual do-
mestic dimension to enter the discourse of national 
identity. Instead, nationalist sentiments put more em-
phasis on the behaviour of other regional countries. 
The pattern of other-reference not only stands in 
contrast to the largely self-referring European nation-
al identity, but also makes it possible for the political 
mainstream to form a united front promoting national-
ist sentiments in East Asia. With the backing of the 
mainstream, functional regional cooperation among 
East Asian countries has been long subordinate to the 
considerations of territorial unity and state sovereignty, 
both of which are essential to state-building. To account 
for the concurrent state-building and regional coop-
eration process in East Asia, a pre-functionalist per-
spective of regional integration may be indispensable. 
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A Currency Unit for Asia?1
Ramkishen S. Rajan
one of the lessons Asian policymakers have taken away 
from the regional financial crisis of 1997-98 is the need 
for a greater degree of monetary and financial coordi-
nation. It is in this context that there has been active 
discussion in the region—more specifically the East 
Asian sub-region—about the possibility of an Asian 
Currency Unit (ACU) as a means of promoting a degree 
of explicit exchange rate stability (Kawai, 2006).  In a 
general sense, the ACU would be a weighted average 
of regional currencies a la the European Currency Unit 
(ECU) which was created in March 1979 under the 
European Monetary System (EMS) and remained in 
operation until the launch of the Euro in January 1999.
At the micro-level the rationale for an ACU is to 
afford the opportunity for regional economic agents to 
invoice regional financial and trade transactions in the 
ACU, hence reducing the region’s dependence on the 
US dollar (USD) and other external currencies. If suc-
cessful, intra-regional intermediation of savings may 
be promoted, in the process possibly reducing the re-
gion’s exposure to external shocks. At a macro-lev-
el, though, it would clearly be premature to consider 
harmonization of Asian exchange rate and monetary 
policies to a common currency basket at this stage (let 
alone a currency union based on the ACU) when nei-
ther the economic nor the political preconditions exist 
to do so. Attempting rigid policy coordination before 
the necessary preconditions are met would be like 
putting the cart before the horse; it is doomed to fail.
In reality, it is unlikely that the ACU will be used on 
a widespread basis for some time to come (Eichen-
greem 2006). The experience of Europe is instruc-
tive in this regard. The initial creation of the ECU did 
not lead to a widespread use of the unit. Even in the 
1990s, until the actual creation of the euro, the vast 
majority of intra-European financial and trade transac-
tions were not in ECUs but in USD primarily and other 
sovereign national European currencies. So it is not 
just the creation that is important; there has to be a co-
ordinated agreement by regional bodies to start trans-
acting in the new unit, failing which no one will want 
to take the first step. The ACU has a better chance for 
success (in terms of becoming a significant regional 
vehicle currency) if a larger set of countries is included 
in the basket. In this regard it is imperative that the 
ACU be broadened from the proposed APT countries 
to also include India, Australia and New Zealand, all 
of which have significant financial market depth (and 
all of which are members of the East Asian Sum-
mit). As Dayaratna-Banda and Whalley (2007) note: 
(W)here..(do)..India, Australia, and New 
Zealand (the latter two are in the Asia-Pacific 
grouping) stand in this? ASEAN has already 
entered into a framework agreement with In-
dia on a comprehensive economic partner-
ship. China has entered into arrangements 
with India, New Zealand and Australia, and 
Japan also has regional arrangements with 
these countries. Some initial negotiations for 
a free trade area between ASEAN, Australia, 
and New Zealand have also begun. These 
three countries have increasingly more open 
economies, and their links with East Asia are 
likely to expand over time…. Including them 
in East Asian regional forums and arrange-
ments expands the set of developed and fast 
growing economies with well-functioning eco-
nomic and financial systems and markets...
The possibility of ASEAN+6 monetary co-
operation can thus not be ruled out (p.41).
It has been suggested that the ACU could be used 
as a means of enhancing internal exchange rate stabil-
ity within the region if the regional central banks begin to 
stabilize their respective currencies to the regional unit 
(i.e. helping reduce the possibility of regional competi-
tive devaluations). The notion of stabilization vis-à-vis 
an internal basket a la Europe’s Exchange Rate Mech-
anism (ERM) is distinct from stabilization vis-à-vis an 
external unit which would require that the ACU in turn 
be pegged in some way to external currencies such as 
the USD or euro, or some weighted average thereof. 
Of course, internal stability does not require an 
external anchor and in fact may exacerbate external 
currency stability if regional countries substitute the 
use of external currencies for the ACU, hence being 
less concerned about fluctuations of their currencies 
relative to the external currencies. Conversely, effec-
tive external stability requires internal stability in the 
sense that if regional central banks do not explicitly or 
implicitly manage their currencies to the ACU, it is irrel-
evant whether the ACU per se is managed against the 
external currencies, as the proposed ACU will remain 
purely a theoretical construct. Indeed, the stated aim 
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of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) at this stage 
is for the ACU to serve mainly as a means of bench-
marking the extent of currency movements/devia-
tions. As the ADB president, Haruhiko Kuroda, noted:
The ACU…could be used to monitor the 
stability of participating currencies and would 
tangibly demonstrate the need for greater ex-
change rate coordination. What Asia needs 
here is basically an exchange rate that is flex-
ible toward the rest of the world but relatively 
stable within the region (Kuroda, 2005, p.5).
Needless to say, the long-term viability of internal 
stabilization in an era of open capital markets requires 
there be an enhancement of regional surveillance, a 
degree of policy coordination, and an augmentation 
of regional liquidity arrangements. Nonetheless, given 
the divergence in economic and institutional structures 
in the region, absent macroeconomic policy coordina-
tion and mechanisms for automatic intraregional fiscal 
transfers, any attempt at formal exchange rate coor-
dination—let alone a full-fledged monetary union—is 
far too risky and premature and will likely be a failure, 
setting back prospects for other forms of economic 
integration. So while it may be premature to use the 
ACU as a nominal anchor for individual Asian curren-
cies in the near-term, it could potentially have a role 
to play in Asian monetary cooperation in the future.
Note
1This article draws on previous work by the au-
thor. See Rajan (2009, chapter 11). 
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Is the Grass Always Greener in Europe? The 
Triumph of Reason over Emotion
Katja Weber
during a recent research trip to East Asia, it became 
readily apparent in numerous conversations with 
scholars, policy-makers and journalists that many East 
Asians greatly overestimate the importance of shared 
values in accounting for Europe’s success in promoting 
peace, stability and prosperity in the aftermath of World 
War II.  A high degree of homogeneity and a common 
European identity, I was told time and again, largely 
explain why it was possible for the Europeans to tran-
scend their historical legacies and bring about institu-
tions that would safeguard peace and promote wealth. 
This tendency on the part of Japanese, Koreans and 
Chinese to view Europe as much more homogeneous 
in the post-1945 period than it actually was (and to 
this day is) is unfortunate in that it leads to undesirable 
(sub-optimal) policy prescriptions for the region.  This 
misperception leads many East Asians to zero in on 
their heterogeneity—to stress their differences rather 
than common ground—and becomes an excuse for 
not tackling historical legacies and actively promoting 
greater cooperation aside from the economic realm.1 
Although “Europeans have had much to unite 
them over the centuries” (Christianity, Western values, 
etc.), as McCormick (2008, 23) reminds us, “they have 
had much more to divide them.  Their common his-
torical experiences have been rare, they speak many 
different languages, they have struggled with religious 
and social divisions…they have gone to war with 
each other with alarming frequency, and they have 
often redrawn their common frontiers in response to 
changes in political affiliation.”  Europe was always a 
mosaic of cultures with diverse political and linguistic 
traditions, and this is captured in the European Union 
(EU)’s motto: Unity in Diversity.  As any European 
would readily admit, there are significant cultural dif-
ferences between Swedes and Italians, Dutch and 
Portuguese, and even the French and the Germans. 
An important factor for Europe’s success in pro-
moting peace, typically missed in Asian accounts, is 
that the Europeans allowed reason to triumph over 
emotion.  Rational calculations and careful cost/benefit 
analyses made it possible for them to bury the hatchet 
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and build cooperative arrangements that have served 
them well for many decades.  The European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) was a perfect example. 
Rather than to let wartime thinking stand in the way of 
postwar cooperation, French foreign minister Robert 
Schuman devised a plan to bring French and German 
coal and steel production under a common High Au-
thority and thereby sought to assure that war between 
France and Germany would become materially impos-
sible.  Similarly, when confronted with the increased 
threat brought about by the outbreak of the Korean 
War, the Europeans carefully weighed their options and 
settled on policies that would maximize their returns. 
As can be seen in the drawn-out discussions concern-
ing the creation of a European Army (Weber 2000), the 
Europeans did not part easily with their sovereignty. 
Once it had become clear that German rearmament 
was necessary, careful deliberations ensued among 
the Western powers as well as within France and Ger-
many, eventually culminating in a proposal to give rise 
to a European Defense Community (EDC).  And when 
the French failed to ratify the EDC Treaty, again, after 
careful cost/benefit calculations and additional guaran-
tees on the part of the British, the Europeans reached 
agreement to proceed with German rearmament within 
the framework of the Western European Union (WEU) 
and agreed to West Germany’s accession to NATO.
At the same time, the founding members of the 
ECSC deemed it beneficial to proceed with greater 
economic integration.  Once more carefully weigh-
ing different proposals before them, the United King-
dom decided that her interests would be best served 
by staying out of a trade agreement that would re-
quire her to curtail her sovereignty significantly, while 
France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries 
elected to bind themselves in the Treaties of Rome, 
giving rise to the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Commu-
nity (Euratom).  Over time, membership in these in-
stitutions, adherence to certain principles, norms, 
and rules, allowed the Europeans to build trust 
and not only change interests, but also identities.
Even though scholars like Friedberg (1993/1994), 
Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002), and Kang (2003) 
have cautioned that comparing Europe and Asia 
may be like comparing apples and oranges (factors 
like democracy, equality and institutions which have 
helped to stabilize the European continent for numer-
ous decades are either non-existent, much weaker, 
or of a fleeting nature in Asia), there are still valuable 
lessons to be learned from Europe.  To be sure, the 
simple fact that international relations theorists have 
studied Europe for centuries is no justification for ap-
plying western concepts, theoretical frameworks, and 
ideas to the East.  In fact, to superimpose Eurocen-
tric ideas onto Asia can easily lead one to erroneous 
conclusions and dubious predictions.  And yet, since 
many East Asians clearly appear to be misperceiv-
ing what led to peace and prosperity in Europe, an 
accurate understanding of Europe’s success story 
would allow them to internalize valuable lessons from 
Europe.  Or, put differently, if Chinese, Japanese, Tai-
wanese, North and South Koreans were to compre-
hend that rational calculations allowed the Europeans 
to transcend their divisive past and bring about insti-
tutions that, over time, changed interests and identi-
ties, East Asians could conduct their own cost/benefit 
analyses and promote greater cooperation in areas 
where they do see common ground aside from eco-
nomics (non-traditional security threats, the environ-
ment, etc.) and thereby, incrementally, create trust.2
Europeans have come a long way since the dark 
days of the two World Wars.  As John McCormick 
(2008: xiii) makes clear, “[t]he physical and psycho-
logical barriers that for so long reminded Europeans of 
their differences have come down, and while national 
and regional identities are still alive and well, Europe-
ans are no longer willing to fight each other to assert 
those identities.”  Over the course of decades, Europe-
ans have learned to identify with each other and their 
institutions rationally rather than emotionally (Green 
2008, 16) and these lessons have served them well. 
It is conceivable that Japan, for instance, could 
take a similarly rational (rather than emotional) ap-
proach to its domestic problems, come to terms with 
the loss of war, get rid off the Yushukan Museum that 
distorts history by portraying World War II as a war 
of liberation from Western imperialism, and stop vis-
its by Japanese prime ministers to the controversial 
Yasukuni Shrine (Weber 2008).  A careful cost/benefit 
analysis would readily yield the huge opportunity costs 
arising from the failure to cooperate more closely with 
its neighbors.  At the same time, Japan’s neighbors 
should conduct their own cost/benefit analyses.  This 
would tell them that playing the history card only ob-
fuscates progress and that they need to manage their 
superiority/inferiority complex.  East Asians, rational 
calculations will yield, can no longer afford to remain 
“stuck” in history or to allow the requirements of shared 
values to stand in the way of greater cooperation. 
In the end, there is no expectation that East Asians 
will duplicate Europe’s success story every step of the 
way, but rather that a better understanding of the fac-
tors that led to European peace and prosperity is likely 
to increase the prospects for further cooperation in 
East Asia.  Although I share Craig Parsons’ cautious 
optimism concerning the possibility for future Asian in-
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tegration, we arrive at this conclusion from significantly 
different conceptual perspectives.  Whereas I attribute 
Europe’s success to the triumph of reason over emo-
tion which allowed for the creation of trust and, over 
time, a change in actors’ interests and identities, his 
main focus centers on the ideological commitments 
of political elites to supranational governance.  Con-
trary to the many pessimistic views regarding Asian 
integration, however, both of us at least are willing 
to entertain the idea that the grass does not have to 
be greener in Europe indefinitely or out of necessity.
Notes
1 In the security realm, East Asian countries have 
largely relied on bilateral (hub-and-spoke) alliances with 
the U.S. and, only recently, become members of multi-
lateral arrangements like the ASEAN Regional Forum, 
the Six-Party Talks, and the East Asia Summit—forums 
which most scholars write off as “paper tigers” or mere 
“talk shops.”
2  For an interesting discussion of a “rules-based (rather 
than values-based) approach” to transcend existing 
obstacles to cooperation in East Asia, see Tanaka with 
Liff, 91.
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EU History and the Possibility of Asian Imitations
Craig Parsons
in the growing literature on Asian regional integra-
tion, as well as in related policy circles, the notion of 
potential lessons from the EU experience is a com-
mon refrain. Some scholars have argued that at 
least some of the foundations for strong regional in-
tegration are present in East Asia, whether in grow-
ing intraregional trade (Frankel 1997; Plummer 
2003), conditions for a “natural monetary grouping” 
(Williamson 1996), or even in broad social founda-
tions, where “The pan-Asian culture and civilization 
is as real as the concept of pan-European culture 
and civilization” (Dutta 2002). Katja Weber’s essay 
in this Forum suggests that a careful assessment of 
the costs and benefits of regional integration in Asia 
might lead to some imitation of the European path.
On the other hand, most of the comparative liter-
ature on integration in Europe and Asia is very pes-
simistic about Asian possibilities. Peter Katzenstein 
is representative in noting (1997: 3) that, “[T]he his-
tory of formal regional institutions in Asia is a history 
of failures so conspicuous, in comparison to Europe, 
that they beg for explanation.” And there is no short-
age of explanations. Which obstacles loom largest de-
pends on which Asian countries we include, but most 
of this literature sees them as more heterogeneous 
than European countries in size, wealth, domestic 
institutions, trade orientation, and other features that 
might tend to underpin regional projects. Min Shu’s es-
say here is closer to this side of the discussion. 
I am no expert on Asia, but it seems to me that 
the pessimistic view is hard to avoid if we ask how 
likely it is that some part of Asia will imitate anything 
like the EU. Most of the structural bases for openness, 
intensive cooperation, and institution-building look at 
least somewhat weaker in Asia today than they did in 
postwar Europe. But in this little commentary, I’d like to 
point out a somewhat ironic line of argument that I de-
veloped with an economist co-author a few years ago 
(Parsons & Richardson 2004). As I see it, the EU itself 
was an unlikely outcome. It did not actually flow very 
tightly from a widely-perceived, favorable set of cost/
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benefit incentives and constraints. Instead it resulted 
from the rather aggressive imposition of a certain insti-
tutional model over a great deal of contestation about 
costs and benefits. The notion that the EU was unlikely 
certainly doesn’t make similar steps in Asia look more 
likely—but it may suggest a more sanguine view about 
the possibility of Asian steps. If EU history teaches us 
that big institutional projects can succeed despite dis-
agreement about many relevant cost-benefit analy-
ses, then the relatively higher cost-benefit obstacles to 
such projects in Asia may not be a crippling obstacle. 
The real question is whether some well-placed Asian 
elites will decide to pursue something similar. I would 
not argue that this is likely either—but the frequent 
references to the EU model in Asian discussions hint 
that at least some elites are thinking in this direction.
I’ll develop this point by considering the three 
main views that theorists and historians have of-
fered about the rise of the EU, and what they 
imply about the possibility of Asian parallels.
One common view of EU history was crafted by An-
drew Moravcsik (1998) and historians like Alan Milward 
(1992), and rests on the aggregation of clear costs and 
benefits. These theorists begin from what they see as 
the clearly-perceived substantive interests of interest 
groups and policy-makers, mainly for and against mar-
ket integration. They see the EU as the result of a fairly 
arithmetic translation of the content and intensity of 
interests into government positions and then into inter-
national bargains. The EU’s elaborate institutions were 
required to pay off the losers and to make credible such 
long-term commitments to openness and cooperation. 
The other classic view of EU history comes from 
institutionalist scholars in the tradition of Ernst Haas. 
This view shares quite a lot with Moravcsik’s, since 
both see integration and institution-building as driven 
mainly by pluralistic societal interest-groups who fol-
low clear cost/benefit analyses for economic advan-
tage. (Haas 1958 was very explicit about these plu-
ralistic liberal foundations, as were the scholars who 
most extensively updated Haas-style theorizing more 
recently: Sandholtz & Stone-Sweet 1998). The Haa-
sian view is different, however, in arguing that another 
set of factors interacts with the simple rational-liberal 
aggregation of benefits and costs. Once new rules are 
created at a regional level, and especially once some 
power is delegated to new regional agents within re-
gional institutions, these instruments of integration 
feed back on the aggregation of costs and benefits. 
European-level rules become targets for mobilization 
that entice new interest groups to mobilize; European-
level agents craft new proposals and coalitions which 
interest groups and national governments alone were 
unlikely to produce. In this view, the process remains 
driven and bounded on the demand side by cost-ben-
efit calculations of societal groups. But institutional 
feedback biases the supply of proposals and soci-
etal mobilization around them in the direction of more 
regional institution-building and delegated power.
If we hold either of these views of EU history, we 
are likely to dismiss any chance that Asia could get 
onto a similar path. Their shared liberal, rationalis-
tic, bottom-up core—that regional projects bubble up 
broadly out of societal-level calculation of costs and 
benefits—immediately directs our attention to ways 
in which Asian societies are more heterogeneous 
and probably less likely to strike these kinds of bar-
gains (whether with feedback from regional rules and 
agents or not). More disparate levels of wealth and 
development probably make for less overlap between 
interest-group benefits. More disparate national re-
gimes and interest-intermediation processes surely 
decrease that overlap as well, and probably decrease 
transparency and make bargaining more difficult. 
Vastly disparate sizes of countries also make for much 
harder balancing problems in international bargaining.
In my view, however, neither of these well-known 
accounts maps very strongly on to what actually hap-
pened in Europe. At every step in the creation of the 
EU, there have been very few careful analyses of the 
costs and benefits of particular integrative steps. The 
actors who have stuck the most closely to clear as-
sessments of costs and benefits for interest groups 
have tended either to oppose or abstain from deci-
sions on EU institution-building. For example, Mil-
ward draws our attention to the fact that literally no 
one undertook any substantial study of the European 
coal and steel sectors in or around the proposal or 
negotiation of the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity (though Milward does not seem to perceive how 
this kind of point undercuts his whole line of argument 
about clear “national interests” in these steps; Mil-
ward 1984, 374). In France (the country I know best), 
the main business actors opposed the ECSC, were 
negatively neutral on the European Economic Com-
munity, and later took no position on the Maastricht 
Treaty and its single currency deal. In the French 
economic ministries—presumably the other set of 
people who might have given careful attention to cost-
benefit calculations—opinions were split on all these 
steps, but with a preponderance of opposition to the 
final decisions on all of them (Parsons 2003). 
These kinds of observations support a third view of 
EU history. In this version, the construction of the EU 
was led by a minority of national political elites who 
were ideologically committed to the development of 
supranational European institution-building. The early 
1950s saw a new debate over the appropriate insti-
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tutional format for European cooperation that cross-
cut most existing lines of political parties and interest 
groups. Elections and coalition-building, however, 
continued to operate along other cleavages (largely 
right-left issues). Over time, elections that operated 
on these largely-unrelated left-right battles sometimes 
installed national leaders who favored supranational 
plans. Though no one in Europe was ever clearly elect-
ed with a mandate for supranational initiatives, these 
leaders’ support on other issues gave them the auton-
omy to pursue that agenda. People like Robert Schu-
man, Guy Mollet, or François Mitterrand in France, or 
Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl in Germany repeat-
edly imposed broad, grand institutional initiatives over 
the more technical complaints of most of their bureau-
crats, interest groups, and many of their political allies.
Though I can only sketch these historical debates 
here, this third view might change how we should 
think about Asian possibilities. Just by acknowledg-
ing the possibility that the EU may have been built 
amid fundamental uncertainty and contestation over 
its costs and benefits, we are encouraged to look at 
Asia differently. This is certainly not to say that we 
can or should ignore the most obvious costs and 
benefits of Asian regional initiatives, as they are per-
ceived by people on the ground. That is always the 
obvious place to start when we ask about what is 
likely in politics. But the most straightforward aggre-
gation of such calculations is rarely decisive for what 
happens, and may not even indicate much about 
it. Nor do I mean to claim that I see Asian elites on 
the verge of producing an “Asian Union” movement 
that could be analogous to the elite networks behind 
the EU project. Nonetheless, the notion that the EU 
was not an obvious response to clear costs and ben-
efits carries the ironic implication that Asian integra-
tion may be more imaginable than most people think. 
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carefully chosen words, delivered as part of his written 
testimony—choose to do so? The answer, it turns out, 
has to do with an underappreciated connection be-
tween the international trade and monetary agendas.
Efforts like those of Mr. Geithner to “talk the dol-
lar down” turn out to have a long and distinguished 
pedigree. Indeed, trade liberalization flourished in the 
1970s and 1980s in part because the shift to a flexible 
exchange-rate regime allowed successive U.S. admin-
istrations to engage in such efforts, and thus to forestall 
periodic protectionist pressures in Congress. By allow-
ing (and sometimes even encouraging) temporary and 
timely depreciations of the dollar, successive adminis-
trations helped keep the U.S. market open to foreign 
trade. Doing so allowed liberal international trading 
arrangements to be maintained and even expanded. 
Understandably, such actions also fostered sub-
stantial controversy abroad. The United States’ foreign 
partners resented the dollar’s role, and especially the 
U.S. government’s ability to shift the costs of economic 
adjustment onto them; and over the course of the past 
two decades, they therefore took steps to level the 
monetary playing field. Chief among these develop-
ments were the introduction of Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) in Europe and the more or less concur-
rent adoption of an explicitly defensive exchange-rate 
strategy in much of east Asia—the latter character-
ized by a willingness to stockpile dollar assets rath-
er than to permit national currencies to rise in value. 
During the run-up to the current economic crisis, 
the consequences of these two developments tended 
to be offsetting, at least insofar as global payments 
imbalances were concerned. The failure of east Asian 
currencies to appreciate significantly against the dol-
lar contributed mightily to those imbalances; mean-
while EMU increased European tolerance of dollar 
depreciation, since this no longer disrupted relations 
within the Single Market to the same extent it once 
did. Europe therefore allowed itself to bear the brunt 
of international economic adjustment, relieving at 
least some of the strains on the U.S. current account.
This was never a sustainable arrangement. Yet 
precisely because monetary authorities in both Eu-
rope and Asia had become marginally less sensitive 
to movements in the dollar’s exchange rate, promoting 
the necessary international economic coordination to 
resolve this problem became more difficult. In particu-
lar, U.S. authorities could no longer rely as completely 
as they had in days gone by on accommodating policy 
adjustments being adopted elsewhere in order to avoid 
undesired movements in the exchange rate of the dollar. 
As a result, the practice of occasionally talking 
the dollar down is not working particularly well, and 
certainly not as well as it once did, as an instrument 
Our Currency, Everyone’s Problem
David Andrews
If little is to be gained by raising the question of ex-
change rates, then why did the incoming Secretary 
of Treasury choose to do so? The answer, it turns 
out, has to do with an important connection be-
tween the international trade and monetary agendas.
during confirmation hearings for his nomination as 
U.S. Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner sparked 
a minor controversy. In his testimony to the Senate, 
Geithner was unusually critical—at least for a lead-
ing U.S. policy official—of Chinese exchange-rate 
policy, suggesting that Chinese authorities were ma-
nipulating the renminbi. Two months later, the Chi-
nese central bank governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, is-
sued a response of kinds.  He suggested that the 
international community should introduce a new re-
serve currency, in order to allow surplus states (like 
China) to diversify their holdings. At about the same 
time, a UN panel of experts mooted a similar idea.
Remarkably, this is the closest that the world’s 
major powers have come to seriously arguing about 
exchange rates during the past year and a half—that 
is to say, as the international financial crisis morphed 
into the deepest global economic recession since the 
1930s. True, last fall Iceland faced a run on its cur-
rency; so have certain European states outside the 
eurozone since then. More recently, Swiss authori-
ties took the unusual step of intervening to resist up-
ward pressure on their currency, prompting dark talk 
of competitive devaluations. But, at least so far—that 
is to say, as of late March 2009—clashes over ex-
change rates have figured surprisingly little in glob-
al crisis discussions. This is especially remarkable 
when compared to the divisive arguments about ex-
change-rate policy that accompanied the much small-
er economic crises of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. 
At first blush, this is a good thing. Exchange-rate 
controversies among states with large economies 
tend to be intractable, and today’s policy agenda is 
already overloaded. Should the external value of the 
dollar suddenly become a subject of serious conten-
tion among the major world powers, the ensuing scene 
is not likely to be edifying. So perhaps we should 
simply be grateful, and leave well enough alone. 
But that begs the obvious question: if little is to 
be gained by raising the question of exchange rates, 
then why did the incoming Secretary of Treasury—in 
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of U.S. foreign economic policy. Time once was that 
America’s leading trade partners in both Europe and 
Asia were deeply and asymmetrically vulnerable to 
a downward shift in the dollar’s exchange rate; and, 
once faced with such a prospect, they would gener-
ally agree to stimulate their domestic economies. Do-
ing so tended to moderate the appreciation of their 
currencies against the dollar, thus protecting na-
tional export industries—just as their governments 
intended. At the same time it would increase their 
populations’ appetites for U.S. imports, which in turn 
served Uncle Sam’s purposes just fine. But times 
have since changed, with the incentives now greatly 
reduced for either Europe or Asia to alter domestic 
policies in this fashion in response to U.S. initiatives.
Geithner’s description of Chinese exchange-
rate practices as “manipulative” in his Senate tes-
timony must be understood in this context, as it 
raised the stakes of resisting U.S. monetary policy 
leadership. Time will tell whether this tactic was 
wise or foolish. Presumably it was the first move in 
a playbook that contained more than one element. 
If so, much will depend on steps two and three.
The larger point is one of an eroded capacity for 
U.S. leadership in monetary matters. As former U.S. 
Treasury Secretary John Connally once put it, “It’s 
our currency but it’s your problem.” Connally ad-
dressed himself to a foreign audience, but he might 
as well have been speaking to future U.S. govern-
ments. For the better part of three decades, periodi-
cally talking down the dollar suited the political needs 
of sitting administrations, while greatly annoying 
America’s partners. With the introduction of the euro, 
and the shift in China’s exchange-rate policy, the 
chickens have finally come home to roost: the U.S. 
is finding it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to 
persuade others to follow its monetary policy lead. 
It is this changed situation that accounts for the 
relative absence of emphasis on exchange rates, and 
in particular on the value of the dollar, in current global 
economic discourse. The Europeans tend not raise 
the issue, at least not nearly as vociferously as they 
have in times past, because they do not care about 
the dollar nearly as much as they once did; EMU al-
lows them this luxury. The Chinese do not raise the 
issue, because to a large extent they already control 
the dollar’s exchange rate with the yuan. And officials 
at the U.S. Treasury, despite desiring an orderly de-
preciation of the dollar against east Asian currencies, 
are normally reluctant to raise the issue either. Why? 
In part because they do not wish to draw attention to 
the fragility of the dollar’s position, given existing inter-
national imbalances; but also because doing so is no 
longer as effective a policy measure as it once was. 
Mr. Geithner’s Senate testimony was therefore un-
usual, especially by the standard of recent years; but so 
far it has done little to bring about Treasury’s preferred 
outcome. Instead, the world’s leading economic pow-
ers feel at greater liberty than at any time since 1945 
to pursue the monetary policies of their own choice, 
with scant regard to the policies behind the greenback. 
There would be problems enough were the 
consequences of this development limited to cur-
rency markets. But they are not. Instead, to the 
extent that they are deprived of the ability to talk 
the dollar down, U.S. policymakers lack an impor-
tant policy instrument once used to help stave off 
protectionist pressures at home. With those pres-
sures fast mounting, this absence will be keenly felt.
In times past, using exchange-rate politics to influ-
ence U.S. domestic discussions of trade policy may not 
have been very pretty, but it was, at least on occasion, 
effective. After all, the chief alternatives available to the 
White House in seeking Congressional support for its 
trade agenda—among them accepting increased pro-
tectionism now, in exchange for promises of increased 
liberalization later—are not especially pretty either. 
Hence the irony of the current situation. In chang-
ing their monetary policy frameworks, the last thing 
either the Europeans or the Chinese intended was 
to undermine the U.S. commitment to free trade. 
But that may well be the end effect—in which case 
our currency will have become everyone’s problem.
Note
This article draws from the last chapter of David 
Andrew’s most recent book, Orderly Change: Inter-
national Monetary Relations since Bretton Woods 
(Cornell University Press, 2008).
David M. Andrews is Professor of Politics and Inter-
national Relations at Scripps College 
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tation of a multi-speed EU: R&D policy can help creating 
a bottom-up process of cohesion across the components 
of a ‘variable geometry’ EU.  Research programs have 
created a community of scientists, industrialists and re-
searchers united in temporary and voluntary associations 
based on common development objectives.  These asso-
ciations have often defined the rules for integration on an 
industrial scale rather than just at the level of research. 
Working together and with the help of EU funding, some 
partnerships have been created from the bottom up and 
have contributed to the implementation of an EU-wide 
process of innovation and cohesion that has proven 
to be much more effective than any top-down action. 
This is not to say that the proposed remedy based 
on education, lifelong learning, research, innovation, and 
infrastructures would solve all competitiveness problems 
for each of the EU member states.  However, it might 
reduce the aggravation of a trend that has seen several 
EU countries (mainly those on the “garlic belt”) lose  po-
sitions in the World Economic Forum rankings and de-
cline under the combined pressure of the most advanced 
countries in the Triad and of the emerging economies.
But even if the EU’s best scenario may be to suc-
ceed in maintaining her current position, Europe shall 
continue to be relevant in proposing to the world a model 
of development and a system of values.  The author is 
convinced that the European citizens, under the EU flag, 
can ensure that Europe continues to be one of the ref-
erence points in the word and inspire mankind with her 
values, her vision, her dream of a better future funded on 
solidarity, multicultural tolerance, peace, and prosperity. 
This new edition is thoroughly revised and extended 
to incorporate updated and new material and data on the 
7th R&D Framework Program, the Lisbon Agenda, the EU 
Reform Treaty, and the EU enlargement. An exhaustive 
introduction to the founding principles, institutions, and ac-
tivities of the EU and an overview of the 15 new and can-
didate member states is also provided for the readers not 
familiar with these basics. The appendix and an accom-
panying website contain ancillary distance-learning ma-
terial, extended readings, country-specific data, and oth-
er materials for producing course notes and visuals. The 
book will be useful for lecturers, students, politicians and 
civil servants who are interested in EU technology policy 
as well as for professionals who are involved in EU-fund-
ed R&D projects, who might be inspired in writing propos-
als with a better chance of being shortlisted for funding.
Attilio Stajano, University of Bologna
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The EU’s Uphill Struggle for Competitiveness
Attilio Stajano
Book summary: Stajano, Attilio. Research, Qual-
ity, Competitiveness: European Union Technol-
ogy Policy for a Knowledge-Based Society, 2nd 
ed. Springer, 2009. 543+xxv p. Hardcover. Fore-
words by Brian M. Murphy and Alberta Sbragia.
this book, written by a former EU officer with ex-
tensive experience in industrial research, is not a 
scholarly monograph on political science, but rath-
er a pragmatic description of the community R&D 
policy and its implications on competitiveness. 
This book covers a gap in EU policy literature by 
addressing the intersection between research policy 
and industrial policy. It analyzes how the EU supports 
the competitiveness of domestic companies and the 
common objective of sustained (and sustainable) eco-
nomic growth. It underscores the difficulty of the chal-
lenge that Europe is facing, and suggests—as a con-
tribution to its solution—investments in education, 
training, lifelong learning, research, and infrastructure. 
The evolution and revamping of the Lisbon Strategy 
is taking place in a decade when the EU is undergoing 
the major institutional changes of enlargement and treaty 
reform.  The political Union, an idea waiting to happen for 
fifty years, might eventually come about by tying up the 
loose ends of the Nice Treaty with the ratification of the 
reformed Lisbon Treaty on EU.  But both in implement-
ing the Lisbon objectives and in pursuing institutional 
changes, member states are not harmonized, synchro-
nized, or unanimous.  Instead a vision of multi-speed 
Union is gaining ground. It manifests itself in the priori-
tization of national interests over shared values and in 
the development of institutional instruments such as the 
enhanced cooperation that are intended to circumvent 
the stumbling blocks introduced by reluctant members.
Can the whole of the EU find ways to successfully 
position herself in front of her competitors?  Is there a 
way to prepare a bright future for the next generations of 
European citizens?  Or is the time come to give way to 
new countries who can take the economic lead that was 
in the hands of the European people for centuries?  The 
answers are likely to be pessimistic if the ongoing institu-
tional transformation does not find a successful solution 
with the ratification of the Treaty on EU before the end 
of 2009.  A strong and united Union, on the other hand, 
would be able to focus her action on building a better fu-
ture for her citizens and strengthening her external action 
with the reinforced instruments of the full-time standing 
President and the high representative for foreign affairs 
and security policy.  R&D can help overcome the fragmen-
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Ian Bache. Europeanization and Multilevel Gov-
ernance: Cohesion Policy in the European Union 
and Britain. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008.
this volume is a logical continuation of Bache’s em-
pirical engagement with EU regional policy and with 
the “Europeanization” of British politics, as well a 
systematization of his theoretical engagement with 
Europeanization and multilevel governance as con-
cepts for “explaining governance change in Europe”. 
The points of reflection it offers are numerous. 
Bache’s key question is whether EU cohesion policy 
(framed as an independent variable) has promoted 
multilevel governance (his dependent variable) in Eu-
rope and in Britain. At the core of his analysis is the 
capacity of the concepts adopted to explain gover-
nance change in European polities. This raises both a 
comparative question as well as a question concern-
ing the purchase and limits of concepts, both as they 
stand and when they have been “cross-fertilized.”
The starting point of the book is Bache’s obser-
vation that while concepts like Europeanization and 
multilevel governance have gained currency in Euro-
pean integration studies, and have obvious connec-
tions when defining policy and institutional change as 
an outcome of the influence of EU policy rationales 
on state agency, “the relationship between them is 
relatively unexplored”. This claim should really be nu-
anced, however, as significant studies do now exist 
that explicitly study this relationship. Bache hints, on 
the one hand, at the relative scarcity of comparative 
approaches to simultaneous analyses of Europeaniza-
tion and multilevel governance. The comparative ap-
proach presented (chapter 5) is based on a categoriza-
tion of European polities as being (to varying degrees) 
“simple” or “compound” with regard to the features of 
both state structures and policy processes. This cate-
gorization forms the basis for applying a “goodness-of-
fit” analysis to selected countries. This however turns 
out to be the weakest chapter in the volume, adding 
very little either to conceptual development or to fram-
ing the British case-study, and dealing too scantily with 
both significant examples and scholarly contributions. 
Bache also hints, on the other hand, at the possible 
theoretical purchase to be achieved by a combination 
of non-rival conceptual frameworks. Accordingly, chap-
ters 2-3 are a critical and thorough, albeit selective, 
review of debate and applications of Europeanisation 
and multilevel governance. In the case of the former, 
Bache claims to innovate conceptually by proposing a 
“revision” of the three-step approach to the analysis of 
Europeanization represented by Risse et al.’s good-
ness-of-fit approach and by advancing a “new defini-
tion” based on additional intervening variables (aimed 
in particular at overcoming its linearity in order to allow 
explanations in terms of “complex” circular causality). 
As for multilevel governance, Bache’s focus is on 
attempts at differentiating this notion in order to extend 
analysis beyond the traditional focus on regions and 
to explore other effects of Europeanisation on further 
internal dynamics of change in state polities (including 
the development of “horizontal” forms of regionalisa-
tion). Consequently, in the case-study of Britain, the 
focus is on the parallel development of regional tiers 
and of regional partnership and multilevel governance 
arrangements as a result of the relative impact of EU 
cohesion policy on British polities. Bache’s conceptual 
strategy is based, again, on a revision and extension 
of the concept of multilevel governance by introduc-
ing a policy networks approach to analysing effects 
in terms of the distribution of power resources. The 
objective is to introduce a revision of “zero-sum” con-
ceptions of multilevel governance as a power shift, in 
order to be able to account for further dimensions like 
metagovernance and “deep Europeanization.” This 
however also highlights the limits of such conceptual 
extension in capturing significant dimensions of relat-
ed processes. This becomes apparent, for instance, 
when the analysis falls short of addressing key poten-
tial implications of multilevel governance practices, 
such as processes of de-territorialization and re-terri-
torialization and related spatial differentiation effects. 
In the case of both Europeanization and Multi-level 
governance, Bache then keeps to an essentially “aggre-
gative” conceptual attitude that builds on pre-defined, 
albeit “revised” and “extended” core assumptions. Yet 
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“increased economic, political and social relations be-
tween people across the planet” (p.3), and they make 
plain they this should be taken to mean that a focus 
on either economic, social, or political processes, by 
themselves, is not adequate. The problem for the edi-
tors is that virtually none of the contributors follow the 
editorial line, instead offering only a series of econom-
ic interpretations of globalization (and EU integration). 
The structure of the volume sags under the weight of 
this economic burden, with Part I being a case in point. 
“Globalization: the General Context” is the title given 
to Part I and as such one might reasonably expect 
chapters which explicate the different dimensions of 
globalization flagged up by the editors in their Intro-
duction. The five chapters in this section instead all 
choose to focus on economic dimensions: market lib-
eralization, growth, inequality, macroeconomic stabil-
ity. Thus, the “general context” turns out to be a rather 
specific one and the book quickly jettisons the mul-
tidimensional approach promised in the Introduction.
Contra Scholte, the contributions in this volume 
tend to view globalization as a unitary and homoge-
nous process. This leads to a predictable oversimpli-
fication of the relationship between the EU and glo-
balization. For most contributors “EU integration is 
similar to globalization” (Verdun, p.207), one aspect 
of globalization (Angelini, p.247), or “institutionalized 
globalization on a European scale” (Hepburn, p.262). 
Verdun actually makes some original claims about the 
relationship between globalization and EU integra-
tion, although these are not taken up elsewhere in the 
volume. She raises the possibility of EU integration 
being a “trigger” for globalization (p. 207), and floats 
the possibility that EU integration developed before 
globalization “took hold of the planet” (p.213). These 
ideas call into question the usual causal priority and 
goes against the grain of Scholte’s historical schema. 
Part III of the book is devoted to “European Inte-
gration as a Response to Globalization” and contains 
the most interesting essays on offer here. These deal 
with a variety of concerns including the “European So-
cial model,” national interests, sub-state regions, and 
regional integration, and marks the point at which the 
book’s concerns move beyond the narrowly econom-
ic. The chapter by Murray contains a more thought-
out position on globalization, i.e. increasingly “porous 
polities, societies and economies due to transnational 
interdependence … and international linkages, un-
even impact and differentiated processes” (Murray, 
p.274). The emphasis on “uneven impact and differ-
entiated processes” stands out in a volume where 
globalization is often reduced to a linear process 
(flows of money, goods, ideas). Of course, the “un-
even impact” can also be discerned within Europe it-
systematically, and rather paradoxically in my view, 
he alludes to the capacity of his conceptual frame-
work to account for other explanatory dimensions, like 
cognitive factors and learning dynamics contributing 
to so-called forms of “thick learning” and “deep insti-
tutionalization” – and this despite the fact that these 
dimensions are neither addressed in an explicit and 
consistent theoretical way, nor adequately referenced 
to existing interpretations of Europeanisation which 
have precisely emphasised and worked out these 
dimensions based upon neo-institutionalist theory.
As a whole, the volume can be hence best cat-
egorised as a monograph on the Europeanisation 
of British regionalism, backed by a skilful and well-
informed exercise in conceptual syncretism, as well 
as by apparent but overstated claims for innovation. 
In this sense, however, it effectively gives expression 
to a diffusely perceived need for a more articulate re-
lationship between conceptual frameworks that have 
dominated the renewal of European policy studies in 
recent years. There is still a long way to go in this direc-
tion because, for instance, a broader transdisciplinary 
concern with the socio-spatial dimensions of Euro-
peanisation would be required to enrich the picture. 
Enrico Gualini
Berlin University of Technology
P. Della Posta, M. Uvalic, and A. Verdun (eds.). 
Globalization, Development and Integration: a Eu-
ropean Perspective. London: Palgrave, 2009.
there have been surprisingly few books on globaliza-
tion and EU integration and so the publication of the 
present volume can be welcomed as a contribution 
to an underdeveloped area of EU studies. The core 
question to which the book addresses itself is stated 
by the editors in their Introduction; “is European inte-
gration a response to globalization?”, and, following 
on from this, “how does European integration offer 
a strategy to deal with the challenges raised by glo-
balization?” These are reasonable questions to ask 
(but perhaps not the best ones) and while not being 
of great originality they at least serve as a focal point 
for the book’s 16 chapters and numerous other dis-
cussion pieces and concluding roundtable. However, 
the questions posed by the editors (not to mention the 
title of the book) require a sophisticated understand-
ing of globalization to animate these rather tired ques-
tions and yield interesting and meaningful answers. 
The editors have chosen to adopt Scholte’s con-
ceptualisation of globalization which emphasises the 
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self, although discussion of this is largely absent here. 
The book will mainly be of interest to scholars who wish 
to explore the economic linkages between Europe and 
the rest of the world but will not find favour, I suspect, 
with scholars who wish to understand the nature and 
dynamics of globalization. I feel that the editors have 
missed a trick in not devoting more space to the issue 
of global governance. As Murray (p. 274) points out 
the EU has come to see globalization less as a threat 
and more and more as an opportunity to assert itself 
through regimes of global governance. Indeed, the EU 
views itself as the “guardian of global governance” (Mur-
ray, p.274). This is an important idea which could have 
given the book an innovative dimension had it been 
picked up and developed by the editors. Instead the 
book remains trapped in thinking about European in-
tegration as response to globalization. The debate has 
moved on, however, and the question of the EU’s role 
in regimes global governance would have formed the 
basis of a more valuable contribution to the literature. 
Chris Rumford
Royal Holloway, University of London
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